Law of the Land – Real Estate Litigation Newsletter (May 19, 2022)


St. Paul’s Basis v. Ives, 29F.4th 32, 33 (1st Cir. 2022)

A current choice out of the First Circuit Courtroom of Appeals emphasizes the significance of a transparent and constant constructing plan early on in the allowing course of. The Courtroom’s choice leaves little doubt that if a undertaking modifications course after its unique constructing allow is issued, there may be minimal authorized recourse to stop a constructing commissioner from requiring the applicant to begin the allow software course of once more – on this case, not even a artful argument invoking spiritual liberty and the proper to brew beer may save an applicant the hassle.

In St. Paul’s Basis v. Ives, Plaintiff St. Paul’s – an Orthodox Christian monastic group – introduced go well with towards the City of Marblehead and the City’s constructing commissioner, claiming that the City had violated the Spiritual Land Use and Institutionalized Individuals Act (“RLUIPA”) by declining to reissue a suspended constructing allow for the improvement of a monastic advanced. Based on St. Paul’s, the refusal to reissue the allow constituted a “substantial burden” on spiritual train. The Courtroom disagreed.

St. Paul’s initially deliberate to transform the property right into a monastic advanced with three completely different areas, together with a brewery and a “fellowship hall” to serve the monks’ house-brewed beer to the public. At the time of their unique constructing allow software, St. Paul’s requested that the fellowship corridor be designated as “A-2 use” underneath the native code, which would come with makes use of meant for foods and drinks consumption. The Marblehead constructing commissioner permitted the plans and issued a constructing allow primarily based on this meant use.

The next 12 months, St. Paul’s architects withdrew from the undertaking, and the Marblehead constructing commissioner suspended the constructing allow till St. Paul’s retained a brand new architect. After retaining a brand new architect, St. Paul’s modified the description of the undertaking to a monastery quite than a fellowship corridor, and requested an “R-2 use” (which implicated completely different limitations on occupancy and plumbing necessities). The Marblehead constructing commissioner declined to reinstate the constructing allow since the scope of work had modified from that upon which the unique allow was primarily based. Based on the commissioner, St. Paul’s had two choices: keep on with the unique scope of work, or submit a brand new software.

Declining each choices, St. Paul’s introduced an motion in federal courtroom alleging that the constructing commissioner considerably burdened its train of faith by refusing to reinstate the constructing allow (regardless of the change in the scope of work). The trial courtroom dominated in favor of the City of Marblehead and the constructing commissioner.

The First Circuit upheld the decrease courtroom’s ruling, reasoning the constructing commissioner’s choice to not reinstate the constructing allow was not “arbitrary and capricious.” As the courtroom identified, it was St. Paul’s who sought to vary the precise scope and use designation of the undertaking mid-stream. As a result of the constructing commissioner was motivated by his want to stop such a “bait-and-switch” quite than to “jerk around” a non secular group, St. Paul’s claims have been rightfully dismissed.


Epstein v. Planning Bd. of Marblehead, 21-P-296, 2022 WL 839054, 100 Mass. App. Ct. 1128 (2022)

The Massachusetts Appeals Courtroom has supplied an vital clarification as to the nature of so-known as web site plan particular permits for purely as-of-right tasks. Underneath Epstein v. Planning Board of Marblehead, a Rule 23 choice, the Appeals Courtroom held that regardless of the phrases “special permit,” web site plan evaluate for as-of-right makes use of should not topic to particular allow course of or standards. 

Plaintiff Epstein lived in a property abutting a single-household house owned by Jacobs. Jacobs sought the Planning Board of Marblehead’s approval of an software for a “special permit for site plan approval” underneath the Marblehead zoning bylaw. Jacobs sought this approval to convey his non-conforming home into conformity with zoning necessities for peak and setbacks. Epstein believed that the proposed modifications would cut back ocean views of the Epstein property. After the Planning Board permitted the software, Epstein challenged the Planning Board’s choice in the Land Courtroom, arguing that the Planning Board choice was misguided for failing to use the particular allow course of and standards to Jacobs’ software. 

The Land Courtroom dominated for the Planning Board, discovering that Jacobs’ software was for a use allowed “as of right” (i.e. to convey the home in conformity with relevant zoning necessities). In consequence, the Land Courtroom reasoned that the course of of the particular allowing statute (§ 9) and the particular allow standards in the Marblehead zoning bylaw have been inapplicable. The Planning Board was subsequently solely required to contemplate whether or not the proposed undertaking’s design was in concord with the prevailing character of the neighborhood, and the extent to which the undertaking would have any hostile results on the abutting heaps.

The Appeals Courtroom upheld the Land Courtroom’s ruling, discovering that the Planning Board utilized the correct standards and adequately thought of the proof offered in approving the web site plan underneath requirements relevant to as-of-right makes use of versus particular allow makes use of.


Haney as Tr. of Gooseberry Island Tr. v. Mashpee, No. CV 21-10718-JGD, 2022 WL 847203 (D. Mass. Mar. 22, 2022)

On this case, the United States District Courtroom for the District of Massachusetts dismissed a criticism towards the City of Mashpee that alleged that the City had made a regulatory taking of the plaintiffs’ non-public property. The courtroom dismissed the case as a result of the City’s actions with respect to the property didn’t represent a “final governmental decision” that definitively decided what improvement is perhaps allowed on the plaintiff’s property. 

In 2011, Plaintiff Haney acquired Gooseberry Island – a 4-acre island in Popponesset Bay in Mashpee. The island is just accessible to these prepared to wade throughout a slim channel of water, and is house to no constructions aside from the remnants of an previous cottage. Haney has endeavored to assemble a house Gooseberry Island since 2013, to no avail.

With restricted entry to the island, Haney utilized for a variance to assemble a bridge and driveway in 2013. This request was denied for failure to adjust to each the Wetlands Shield Motion and native Mashpee equal. After an attraction and adjudicatory listening to, the Division of Environmental Safety (DEP) proposed that Haney assemble a metal bridge as a substitute of a timber bridge, however, as a result of the metal bridge various was considerably completely different than the proposed timber bridge, Haney was required to submit a brand new software. He declined to take action, and as a substitute unsuccessfully appealed the DEP’s order in courtroom.

In 2018, Haney filed three completely different purposes for variances from the Mashpee zoning bylaws for the development of a single-household house on the island. The purposes have been denied as a result of of the absence of a wetlands allow, which Haney would want to assemble a bridge that would offer entry to the island. Haney appealed the denials and likewise moved to consolidate the 2018 denials with the 2013 denial of the preliminary variance requests. Haney argued that the authorities’s denial of the 2013 and 2018 variances constituted a taking in violation of the Fifth Modification as a result of it disadvantaged him of all economically useful use of his property.

The Courtroom dismissed Haney’s case reasoning that his claims have been “not ripe,” or in different phrases, that Haney had not pursued all potential avenues by way of the administrative course of and subsequently had not obtained a “final” choice on his particular variance purposes, such that there had been no “taking” of his property. With regard to the 2013 variances, the Courtroom noticed that the DEP’s supply of a metal bridge was nonetheless on the desk. It was Haney who had didn’t submit a brand new software for a metal bridge. Equally, since the 2018 variance instantly stemmed from the 2013 variances, it may hardly be stated that denial of the 2018 variance would deny Haney the financial profit of his property. To the opposite, Haney holds the skill to use for the metal bridge as a predicate to securing variance approval for the home. As such, the authorities has not taken last motion depriving Haney from all attainable useful financial use of his property.


Summit Farm Photo voltaic, LLC vs. Planning Bd. for New Braintree, No. 18 MISC 000367 (HPS), 2022 WL 522438 (Mass. Land Ct., Feb. 18, 2022)

In Summit Farm Photo voltaic, the Massachusetts Land Courtroom despatched a pleasant message to solar energy builders by overturning the New Braintree Planning Board’s denial of a particular allow to construct an eight-acre photo voltaic farm close to the heart of city. Notably, the Courtroom held that native regulation of photo voltaic vitality services could not prolong to prohibition besides underneath the most extraordinary circumstances.

Plaintiff Summit Farm Photo voltaic LLC leased eight acres of a forty-three-acre farm close to distinguished roadways and intersections at the heart of the rural, bucolic city of New Braintree. Summit utilized for a particular allow to assemble a photo voltaic vitality facility pursuant to the New Braintree Zoning Bylaws, which the Planning Board denied as a result of of the visible affect of the proposed facility. Summit Farm appealed the denial to the Land Courtroom. 

The New Braintree Zoning Bylaw supplies that enormous, floor-mounted photo voltaic vitality services should get hold of a particular allow from the Planning Board. A particular allow might be granted when one of the following circumstances are met: (1) the location of the facility can’t moderately be seen from a residence or public approach throughout all seasons of the 12 months, or (2) the location of the facility is so distant from a residence or public approach, or so obscured by tree strains and/or vegetation that the visible affect of the facility is negligible. 

To fulfill these necessities, Summit proposed an intensive plan so as to add timber and vegetation round the total facility such that there could be just about no view of the panels from public methods and/or close by residences inside 5 years. The Planning Board nonetheless denied Summit’s software (twice), reasoning that the proposed screening didn’t meet the necessities underneath the Zoning Bylaw.

On attraction, the Land Courtroom held that the Planning Board’s denial was untenable for 2 causes. First, it didn’t adjust to Chapter 40A, § 3 of the Massachusetts Normal Legal guidelines zoning offering exemptions to photo voltaic vitality services. Underneath this provision, a zoning ordinance can’t prohibit or unreasonably regulate the set up of a photo voltaic vitality facility besides when essential to guard the public well being or welfare. As a result of the Planning Board’s denial of Summit’s particular allow software was primarily based solely on aesthetic causes, the Land Courtroom discovered the prohibition to be inconsistent with 40A, § 3. Second, regardless that the board’s discretionary energy of denial is broad and its choices are usually entitled to deference, the place at trial the courtroom concludes that no rational view of the details may assist the denial, the case presents that seldomly encountered state of affairs the place a courtroom will reverse the denial of a particular allow.

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